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Abstract—Peer-to-peer paradigm is increasingly employed for
organizing distributed resources for various applications, e.g.
content distribution, open storage grid etc. In open environments,
even when proper access control mechanisms supervise the access
to the resources, privacy issues may arise depending on the
application. In this paper, we introduce, PANACEA, a system
that offers high and tunable privacy based on an innovative
resource indexing approach. In our case, privacy has two aspects:
the deducibility of a resource’s existence/non-existence and the
discovery of the provider of the resource. We systematically
study the privacy that can be provided by the proposed system
and compare its effectiveness as related to conventional P2P
systems. Employing probabilistic reasoning, we quantify the
privacy and analytically derive that PANACEA can offer high
privacy, while preserving high search efficiency for authorized
users. Moreover, the privacy offered by the proposed system can
be tuned according to the specific application needs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are increasingly used in many
distributed application domains, e.g. content distribution, file
sharing, open storage grids, video streaming, etc. However,
users typically expect to be able to use these systems to share
access-controlled and (semi-) private data. Conventional P2P
systems should be properly adapted to meet the access control
requirements of such applications. Typical approaches for data
access control in open environments include cryptographic
methods [1], Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies,
and trust-based methods [2], which require complicated key
distribution and management. We consider a simpler, yet
effective, approach for data access control in P2P systems:
We assume that resources reside at the publisher nodes itself,
to ensure that access control is enforced safely in an untrusted
P2P environment. A user directly presents his credentials to
the publishing peer of a particular resource after locating the
resource in the P2P overlay. The publishing peer replies the
query after applying its local authorization policies.
P2P systems typically try to maximize search efficiency.
To this extreme, structured P2P systems, such as Chord [3],
Kademlia [4], employ an index implemented as a Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) over the P2P overlay. Such an index typi-
cally consists of index entries of the form (key, value)-pairs,
where the key is the resource identifier (often produced by
one-way hash functions, e.g. MD5), while the value is the peer
identifier, where the resource is stored. Indeed, as shown in [3],
such an index significantly improves the search costs, in terms
of both query latency and communication overhead. However,
as index entries are hosted on arbitrary and often untrusted
nodes, access to the index entries cannot be controlled by
the peers that publish their data to the index. Thus, the index
reveals both the existence/non-existence and the location (i.e.
publishing peer) of each queried resource, hence, data privacy
is breached. We refer the former privacy aspect concerning
resource existence/non-existence as resource privacy, while
the latter one concerning resource location as provider privacy.
On the other extreme, unstructured P2P systems, such as
Gnutella [5], employ no index and limited-hop flooding is
used for locating the queried data, which incurs high latency
and communication overhead, yet, with no guarantees on the
data discovery. However, if access-controlled, unstructured
P2P systems can provide the highest data privacy by answering
queries only to authorized users. Thus, there is a trade-off
between search efficiency and data privacy in this context.
In this paper, we explore this trade-off and propose a Pri-
vAcy preserviNg Access-ControllEd (PANACEA) P2P system
that combines high data privacy (both resource and provider
privacies) and high search efficiency for authorized users. To
carefully quantify privacy offered by PANACEA, we define
the privacy objectives using probabilistic reasoning. We ana-
lytically study the privacy and the search efficiency/overhead
of the PANACEA, as related to structured and unstructured
P2P systems. The parameters of PANACEA can be tuned so
that the trade-off between privacy and search efficiency is set
according to the application needs. Numerically evaluating
our analytic results for practical systems, we demonstrate
that, with proper values for the parameters of PANACEA,
authorized users almost always find the queried resources at
a very low search overhead, while unauthorized users can
deduce the existence of a resource and its provider with a
very low probability. Moreover, the communication overhead
is high for unauthorized users. Figure 1 illustrates the posi-
tion of PANACEA as related to structured and unstructured
P2P access-controlled systems in the three-dimensional space
<provider privacy, resource privacy, search efficiency>, em-
ploying the terminology of [6]. To the best of our knowledge,
PANACEA is the first approach that concurrently addresses
resource and provider privacies in access-controlled systems.
Note that the specific authorization policy and the format of
credentials are orthogonal to current scope of the paper. As a
result, PANACEA mechanism can be employed by providers
with different access control techniques, such as role based
access control, discretionary access control or attribute-based
access control, all existing in the system simultaneously.
Fig. 1. Position of various systems on privacy and search efficiency axes
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion II, we describe the publishing and searching mechanisms
in PANACEA. In Section III, we analytically derive the privacy
properties and the search overhead. In Section IV, we discuss
PANACEA’s effectiveness against privacy breach attempts. In
Section V, we numerically evaluate the proposed system and
demonstrate its tunability. In Section VI, we discuss the related
work, and we conclude in Section VII.
II. THE PANACEA SYSTEM
In this section, we present the proposed PANACEA system
and explain how the resource and provider privacies are
achieved. As already mentioned, resource privacy has two
aspects: one concerns with existing and shared resources,
the second with non-existing resources: an unauthorized user
should not be able to determine that a particular resource
does not exist in the system, a property which is inherent to
unstructured systems.
A. Overview
The proposed system aims to combine look up efficiency of
structured peer-to-peer systems with high resource privacy that
is offered in unstructured ones. PANACEA employs a DHT
to host the proposed resource and provider privacy-preserving
(RPP) index, which addresses both resource and provider
privacies of the shared resources. However, as explained later
in this section, PANACEA indexes only a subset of the
resources into the DHT; this is a necessary characteristic
for providing resource privacy. The rest of the resources are
located by flooding, similar to the unstructured P2P systems.
As a result, PANACEA acts partly as an unstructured P2P
system for the resources not indexed in the DHT, and partly
as structured systems which can be configured as explained
later in the section.
The proposed indexing mechanism consists of tunable pa-
rameters that allow the application designer to choose between
strong privacy guarantees and increased search efficiency
based on the specific application needs. The tuning determines
the position of the resulting system in the graph of Figure 1,
as compared to structured and unstructured P2P systems. We
highlight the publishing and search mechanisms in Section
II-B and in Section II-C respectively.
Fig. 2. Privacy preserving publishing in PANACEA
B. Privacy Preserving Publishing
PANACEA achieves the resource and provider privacy goals
with privacy-aware publishing mechanism, which mainly em-
ploys two novel techniques:
1) Probabilistic publishing
2) Resource and provider privacy preserving (RPP) index-
ing
The approach is illustrated in Figure 2. Recall that resource
privacy concerns unauthorized users deducing the presence
of the existent resources and the absence of non-existent
resources in the system. The RPP indexing is introduced to
address the former aspect. However, as the absence of a key
in the DHT of PANACEA could enable a user to deduce its
non-existence in the network, we also introduce probabilistic
publishing described below, which addresses the latter aspect
of resource privacy.
1) Probabilistic publishing: PANACEA, instead of an-
nouncing every resource into the DHT, as in structured P2P
systems, announces a resource with a system- defined proba-
bility µ- and creates an RPP-index entry, which is described
later. Thus, non-existence of a particular resource in the
system can not be deduced with certainty from the DHT as
absence of an index entry for a key does not necessarily mean
non-existence of its corresponding resource in the system.
Due to probabilistic publishing, PANACEA acts as a hybrid
semi-structured P2P system. All the resources that are not
announced in the DHT are discovered using flooding for a
limited number of hops determined by a time-to-live (TTL)
set on search queries.
2) The RPP index generation: We resort to k-
anonymization techniques to achieve both resource and
provider privacies for the resources selected to be announced
into the DHT by the probabilistic publishing phase. A
k-anonymization technique typically anonymizes a data item
by hiding it inside a list of k data items so that a user can
not make out anything about the original intended data item.
Instead of having a (key, value) pair as an index entry for a
resource, as in structured P2P systems, we propose the index
entry pair to consist of a list of keys and a list of values, i.e.
(key[], value[]), which is derived by applying resource and
provider anonymization as explained in the following. We
refer to such an index entry as (m,n)-index entry, where m
refers to cardinality of key list and n refers to that of value
list. In this terminology, an index entry of the conventional
structured P2P systems can be seen as a (1, 1)-index entry.
From an (m,n)-entry, we claim that a user can deduce the
existence of a resource with probability 1m and provider by
1
n . Clearly, the greater the values for m and n, lower the
probability to deduce and hence, higher the privacy they offer,
but at an increased publishing and searching overhead, as
explained later in this section. A (1, 1)-entry denotes the fact
a particular peer publishes a particular resource, whereas
a (m,n)-entry means that one or more of these listed peers
publish one or more of the listed resources.
Resource anonymization: Once a resource is selected for
publishing, the corresponding (1, 1)-index is selected for
resource anonymization to convert it into a (m, 1)-index. We
consider two techniques to choose the m − 1 entries of the
key list for anonymization: i) select random keys, ii) select
semantically closer keys. Below, we briefly outline both the
techniques and compare them against potential attacks for
inferring the valid key from the list.
Note that human-readable plain text keys (i.e resource
names), employed by users to refer to the resources, are
mapped by a hash function to the system key space (i.e.
resource ids). We refer to such a resource namespace as R,
the equivalent resource key space as K, and the hash function
as H : R → K. When a resource with name r is to be
anonymized, in fact, it is the (1, 1)-entry for key H(r) that is
anonymized.
In the randomized anonymization technique, m-1 number
of entries chosen randomly from the set R are hashed to the
set K to make the m entries needed for a (m, 1)-index.
In semantics-based anonymization, m-1 resources are se-
lected from the set S ⊂ R (|S|  |R|) of resources
semantically correlated to r and their corresponding keys form
the m entries of a (m, 1)-index. We assume that the user feeds
such keys and argue that automating such a task is a research
study in itself.
In order to infer the valid key from the list of m keys,
an adversary first has to derive the resource names from the
resource ids using brute force approach. Such a dictionary
attack is computationally easier on semantics-based technique
as |S|  |R|. However, inferring a valid name from the ran-
dom entries selected in randomized anonymization is simpler
than inferring from semantically closer keys. In the rest of the
draft, we assume that a user can learn from an (m,n)-entry
that each of the m keys is equally probable of being a valid
entry with probability 1m .
Provider anonymization: After resource anonymization, the re-
sulting (m, 1)-index entry is fed into the provider anonymizer.
The provider list is populated with n number of entries with
the providing peer itself being one of them. The other n − 1
entries are chosen randomly from the Provider Store (PStore)-
a local database of provider ids. We assume that PStores at
each peer are populated with some providers in the network
during the network bootstrapping phase, which are selectively,
expanded incrementally over time with providers listed in the
the put() requests traversing through the peer.
3) The RPP index insertion: After an (m,n)-index entry
is constructed by a publishing peer, it has to be inserted
into the network using the DHT’s put() method, with a
slightly modified semantics for the put() interface over the
conventional structured systems. However, this index entry
must be published anonymously as next-hop node in the
routing, can easily deduce the valid publisher node from the
(m,n)-entry, as the initiator node itself is the publisher.
Anonymous publishing: To anonymize the node that initiates
the insertion request, we propose that a randomized routing
(RR) phase preceding the DHT’s put() operation. Each node
that receives the insertion request decides to forward it to
a random node in its PStore with a certain probability λ
or initiate the DHT routing of the put(m,n) method with
probability 1−λ. Forwarding put() requests to random nodes
in the overlay instead of neighboring ones, as was introduced
in [6], with a few modifications is necessary; otherwise, if a
node received a put() request from a neighboring node that is
contained in the provider list, it could assign a high probability
that its neighbor is the publishing node. However, randomly
choosing next hop nodes from PStore at each peer ensures
that the identity of the valid resource provider is not leaked
during resource publishing in the DHT, as there is no way for
a peer that receives put(m,n) request to determine whether
the preceding peer is the publisher or a relay node.
The RR phase introduces additional communication over-
head compared to DHT’s put(). This process can be viewed
as a geometric distribution with parameter λ. Therefore, if X
is the random variable that describes the number of hops of
a put() request, then the probability that it travels x hops is
given by:
P (X = x) = λx−1(1− λ)
The expected number of hops in randomized routing is given
by the mean of the geometric distribution, i.e. E(X) = 1/λ.
To this end, we assume that PStore caches the IP address along
with each provider id. Thus, the relaying of put() can happen
in O(1). Moreover, the IP address for each provider is stored
in the provider list of the (m,n)-index entry.
Insertion into the DHT: When a node in the RR routing de-
cides to enter the DHT routing, it invokes put(m,n) operation,
which is implemented using conventional put() interface as
follows. Note that the put() operation inserts only a (1, 1)-
index entry. Yet, the same can be used to insert a (1, n)
entry, as the value field is not used in the DHT routing. Thus
put() can act as put(1, n). Hence, we propose to convert the
put(m,n) request into m number of put(1, n) requests, with
each of the m keys (pivot), acting as the key and the n number
of providers acting as the value list required for a put(1, n).
Subsequently, for every get() request on any of the m keys,
the same set of n providers is returned, as the index entry is
present on m nodes responsible for each of the keys. However,
such a reply to get() request can not reveal the presence or
absence of the resource in the system, because of the way the
index was constructed.
Note that, since the keys in an index entry are chosen
independently by peers, key collisions in the DHT are possible.
Key collisions also happen when multiple copies of the same
resource are inserted into the DHT. We propose that the list
of providers in the new index entry is simply appended to the
list of already existing providers for the collided key.
C. Searching
When a peer searches for a resource with id r, it executes
get(r). If a (m,n)-index entry was published in the DHT with
r being one of the m ids, then the peer returns this index
entry to the searcher. Subsequently, the searcher contacts all
the n providers. Note that, in general, a user does not know
in advance to which providers he is authorized for resource r,
unless he has contacted them before for the same resource. In
the latter case, the searcher could select only certain nodes
from n to contact. Once a provider is selected, it can be
reached in O(1), since its IP address is maintained in the
index entry along with the provider id. In case of multiple
(m,n) entries matched because of key collisions, we assume
that the searcher contacts all the providers listed in all the
entries. If no (m,n)-entry exists in the DHT, then the searcher
floods the search request to its neighbors in the overlay with
a limited hop-count (Time-to-Live, TTL), as would happen in
an unstructured peer-to-peer system.
However, in case of multiple providers for same resource, an
(m,n)-index entry for an existing resource may not contain
all the providers of that resource in the system because of
probabilistic publishing in PANACEA. In other words, the
index entry is not always complete. As a result, a searcher
may not be able to reach the provider where he is authorized
through the RPP index. Therefore, even if an (m,n)-index
entry is present in the index, the searcher may have to employ
limited-hop flooding. However, the probability that a query is
both sent to the DHT and flooded over the overlay is very low,
as shown in Section III, for reasonable values of µ, the DHT
index entries are complete with high probability and contain
all potential providers of a resource.
A simple modification in the publishing algorithm can
significantly increase the completeness of the DHT. In the
randomized routing, each relay hop of the put() request adds
itself in the provider list of the request, in case it has one of
the resources listed. This approach does not violate privacy
and increases the look up efficiency of the DHT.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analytically study the privacy offered
by PANACEA and estimate its communication overhead. We
evaluate the privacy breach that can be achieved by a user
who has complete information of the underlying system mech-
anism (PANACEA, structured or unstructured) and queries
the system for a particular resource. We consider this as the
worst case scenario for privacy breach with a single-query.
Other cases where users have limited or no knowledge of the
systems and case of attacks employing multiple queries to
violate privacy of PANACEA, are discussed in Section IV.
In the analysis, we employ probabilistic reasoning and use
the following notation:
i) PK the probability for a user to deduce the existence of
a certain existing/shared resource.
ii) PV the probability for a user to find the provider of a
certain resource.
iii) P− the probability for a user to deduce the non-existence
of a certain non-existing resource.
Moreover, we consider these probabilities separately, for the
cases that a user is authorized or not (unauthorized), to access a
copy of the requested resource and denote them as PK,a, PV,a
and PK,u, PV,u respectively. Note that it does not make sense
to consider separately P− for authorized and unauthorized
users for non-existent resources. We use superscript U and
S to denote metrics for unstructured and structured systems
respectively, and a metric without any superscript is used
for PANACEA i.e., PUK,u refers to unstructured systems and
equivalent metric for PANACEA is denoted by PK,u.
Definition 1: An access-controlled system is said to provide
higher privacy if it promises:
i) Lower probabilities for PK,u, PV,u, which addresses an
unauthorized user deducing a resource’s presence and its
provider.
ii) Lower probabilities for P−, which addresses a user
deducing a resource’s non-existence.
Under this definition of privacy, any privacy-enabling access
control mechanism should try to minimize Pu, P−. How-
ever, the search efficiency of the privacy-enabling mechanism
should remain high, i.e. : a) PK,a, PV,a should ideally be
1, which addresses authorized users ability to access the
resources and discovering the providers, and b) the search
communication cost Cs,a should be kept low.
To this end, we require that the PANACEA should achieve
the best of the unstructured and structured systems, w.r.t
the privacy and search efficiency. Specifically, the privacy
efficiency objectives for PANACEA are:
• PK,u ∼ PUK,u and PV,u ∼ PUV,u i.e., PANACEA should
be closer to privacy-strong unstructured systems in the
case of unauthorized searches
• P− ∼ PU− i.e., PANACEA should act like unstructured
systems in hiding non-existence of resources
• Cs,u ∼ CUs,u i.e., unauthorized searches should be as
costly as that of unstructured systems
• Cs,− ∼ CUs,−
On the other hand, the search efficiency objectives for
PANACEA are:
• PK,a ∼ PSK,a and PV,a ∼ PSV,a, i.e. PANACEA’s privacy
mechanisms should be transparent to authorized users like
in privacy-free structured systems
• Cs,a ∼ CSs,a, i.e. the search performance of PANACEA
should be closer to that structured systems
Next, we analytically model the privacy and performance
properties of the three systems by assuming a user assuming
the roles of an authorized and unauthorized user to access
an existing resource r. Let N be the number of peers in the
system and Nc be the expected number of copies of r in the
system. Na ≤ Nc be the number of providers where the user
is authorized to access r. For an existent resource Nc ≥ 1
and Na ≥ 1, Na = 0 for an authorized and unauthorized
user, respectively. For non-existent resources, Nc = 0. For
simplicity, we assume, without loss of generality, that both
Nc and Na nodes are uniformly distributed in the network.
In an unstructured system, the search involves limited-hop
flooding. Once a resource is found, if the user is authenticated,
the query is directly replied to him. Otherwise, the query is
further flooded. In PANACEA, if the requested resource that
the user is authorized to access, is not indexed in PANACEA,
he can discover its presence, only when at least one of the
Na providers is contacted in the search process. We assume
that the providers do not respond to search queries from
unauthorized users, in order not to compromise the resource
and provider privacies.
A. Structured P2P systems
As structured P2P systems have index available for all users,
they offer no resource and provider privacies. Therefore,
PSK,a = P
S
V,a = P
S
− = P
S
K,u = P
S
V,u = 1 (1)
The associated publishing and discovery costs Cp, Cs for a
single resource (copy) are given by:
CSp,a = C
S
s,a = C
S
s,u = C
S
s,− = O(logN) (2)
B. Unstructured P2P systems
We assume that the peers are organized in an overlay graph
with average degree d. We first quantify the expected number
of nodes α that are visited by flooding with TTL set to
ttl. Since it is assumed that resource copies are uniformly
distributed, we derive that p = NaN is the probability of visiting
one of the Na nodes in next-hop. To this end, α is given by:
α =
ttl∑
i=1
Ti , where (3)
Ti =

d, for i = 1∑Ti−1
j=0
(
Ti−1
j
)
pj (1− p)(Ti−1−j) (Ti−1 − j)(d− 1),
for i > 1

In unstructured P2P systems, PUK,a and P
U
V,a are always the
same as they are discovered at the same time, and are given
by:
PUK,a = P
U
V,a = 1−
(
1− Na
N
)α
(4)
The expected publication and query costs are given by:
CUs,a = α and C
U
p,a = 0 (5)
Since no provider would reply to unauthorized queries, the
presence of the resource can never be deduced. Therefore,
these systems offer the highest resource and provider privacies.
PUK,u = P
U
V,u = 0 (6)
The expected query cost is given by:
CUs,u = α (7)
Regarding the deduction of the non-existence of a particular
resource, it suffices to calculate the probability to discover
if a single copy exists into the system. However, observe that
discovering a non-existent resource is similar to discovering an
unauthorized existent resource in the unstructured P2P system.
Thus, non-existence can be deduced with probability:
PU− = P
U
K,u (8)
Also, the associated query cost is given by:
CUs,− = α (9)
C. PANACEA
Note that if the user finds (m,n)-entry for r in the DHT,
as an authorized user, he can deduce the existence of r with
probability 1, in case one of the Na nodes has published that
(m,n)-entry, since as part of the search process, he contacts
all the providers listed in the index entry. However, if i number
of nodes, where the user is not authorized to, publish (m,n)-
entries, the user can deduce the existence of the resource with
the probability of being one out of the expected number of
distinct keys (i(m−1)+1)(1−fk(Nr)) in the DHT entries for
this resource and with probability PUK,a to find it by flooding.
The parameter fk is the probability of key collisions in the key
lists of the different (m,n)-index entries in the DHT when
Nr resources are stored in the system and it is derived as the
number of m disjoint partitions of |R| − Nr resource keys
over the number of their total combinations into sets of size
m. If the requested resource is not published into the DHT,
the user learns about the resource with probability PUK,a. This
reasoning is captured in the following equation:
PK,a =
[
1− (1− µ)Na] · 1+
(1− µ)Na ·
Nc−Na∑
i=1
(
Nc −Na
i
)
µi(1− µ)(Nc−Na−i)
·
[
1
(i(m− 1) + 1)(1− fk(Nr)) + P
U
K,a
]
+ (1− µ)Nc · PUK,a ,
where fk(Nr) =
|R|−Nr
m(|R|−Nr
m
)
(10)
We apply the same analogy used in (10) to derive PV,a.
However, when a number i of providers where the user is
not authorized to, publish into the DHT, the expected number
of distinct providers in the index entry is approximated by
i·n·(1−fv), where fv is the probability of provider collisions
among the provider lists of different (m,n)-index entries in
the DHT and it is derived similarly to fk.
PV,a =
[
1− (1− µ)Na] · 1+
(1− µ)Na ·
Nc−Na∑
i=1
(
Nc −Na
i
)
µi(1− µ)(Nc−Na−i)
·
[
1
(i · n)(1− fv) + P
U
V,a
]
+ (1− µ)Nc · PUV,a
(11)
Recall that, for each (m,n)-index entry insertion, m number of
index entries have to be inserted into the DHT, each incurring
a cost of Cp,a. The searching cost depends on whether one of
Na nodes published into the DHT or not. If none of them
published, CUs,a should be accounted for. Each search also
incurs the look up cost on the DHT. Hence, the expected
publishing and searching costs are given by:
Cp,a =
Nc∑
i=1
(
Nc
i
)
µi(1− µ)(Nc−i) · i ·
(
1
λ
+m · CSp,a
)
Cs,a = CSs,a + (1− µ)Nc · CUs,a +
Nc∑
i=1
(
Nc
i
)
µi(1− µ)(Nc−i)
·
[
i · n · (1− fv) +
(
1− Na
Nc
)i
CUs,a
]
(12)
We can derive PK,u, PV,u from (10) and (11) respectively by
observing that for an unauthorized user Na = 0 and replacing
PUK,a,P
U
V,a with P
U
K,u,P
U
V,u respectively.
The expected searching cost for an unauthorized user is
given by:
Cs,u =CSs,u + (1− µ)Nc · CUs,u+
Nc∑
i=1
(
Nc
i
)
µi(1− µ)(Nc−i) [i · n · (1− fv) + CUs,u]
(13)
Finally, we derive P−, i.e. the probability to deduce the non-
existence of a non-existent resource. Given an event space Ω =
{Find, NotFind}, representing that a non-existent resource is
found or not in the DHT respectively, the probability of non-
existence (Pr(NE)), as deduced by a user, is given by:
P− = Pr(NE | Ω) =Pr(NE | NotF ind) · Pr(NotF ind)
+ Pr(NE | Find) · Pr(Find) ,where
Pr(NE | NotF ind) =PUK,u
Pr(NE | Find) =m− 1
m
Pr(Find) =
[
1−
(
1− 1| R |
)µNr(m−1)]
Pr(NotF ind) =1− Pr(Find)
(14)
Nr is the total number of resources in the system and R
is the resource namespace. Pr(NE | NotF ind) expresses
the probability that a resource is non-existent, given that it
is not found in the DHT. This is similar to the probability
of deducing the existence of an unauthorized resource for
a user in unstructured P2P systems, because an existing
resource is same as a non-existing resource for an unauthorized
user. Pr(NE | Find) is the probability that the resource
corresponding to the key does not exist. Pr(Find) expresses
the probability that an arbitrary resource name from space R
may have been inserted into the index, while Pr(NotF ind)
is the complement of Pr(Find). Observe that P− is minimal
(∼ 0) for reasonable values of the various parameters.
Finally, we estimate the expected query cost to deduce the
non-existence. The user first searches for an index entry and
then employs flooding, hence,
Cs,− = CSs,− + C
U
s,− (15)
IV. PRIVACY BREACH ATTEMPTS
In this section, we analyze the privacy properties of
PANACEA with repetitive querying attempts of privacy breach
by an adversary with complete information on the parameters
of the system. First, we consider the case where the adversary
is incapable of employing traffic sniffing and analysis in
the network. Consider a resource r published by multiple
providers into the DHT. Since multiple (m,n)-index entries
exist for r, the provider list is expected to be larger than that
of a resource published by only one provider. An adversary,
observing such larger provider lists than the usual ones in his
repetitive queries for different resources, can learn that r exists
in the system with higher probability, than other resources.
However, this breach in resource privacy is expected to be
small for two reasons: i) The provider lists of (m,n)-index
entries also grow for randomly selected keys over time, as
for each put(m,n) request m− 1 keys are randomly selected
from |R| and they may collide with existing keys in the DHT.
ii) Provider lists are not expected to grow linearly with the
number of copies of real or fake keys due to collisions in the
provider lists.
If we assume that traffic sniffing and analysis are also
employed by the adversary, then provider privacy can be
negatively affected. Specifically, if the adversary monitors the
input and output interfaces of a node publishing a new resource
in the DHT, he can deduce that the node is the provider of one
of the m resource keys that the adversary observes. However,
resource privacy is not breached as resource existence can only
be deduced with probability 1/m.
If the adversary does not have complete information for
PANACEA, then the achievable resource and provider priva-
cies of the system further improve. For example, we consider
the extreme case where the adversary has no information
on the parameters of the system. In this case, the adversary
obtains a provider list in a query for a certain resource that
exists in the DHT. However, assuming that he is not authorized
to that resource, there is no way for him to deduce whether
a key in the DHT corresponds to a real resource or not, and
therefore his probabilities PK,u, PV,u, P− become 0.
The study of the effectiveness of PANACEA against more
sophisticated attack strategies is left for future work.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we numerically evaluate PANACEA as
related to unstructured and structured access-controlled P2P
systems based on the analysis of Section III. Unless otherwise
specified, we assume that each system consists of N = 10000
peers with the unstructured system organized in an overlay
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graph of average degree d = 4. The searcher is assumed
to be authorized to Na = 5 out of Nc = 50 copies of
the queried resource. The TTL employed for limited-hop
flooding is ttl = 6 and the parameters of PANACEA are:
m = 5, n = 5, λ = 0.2, µ = 0.6. The collision parameters are
specified as fk = 0.1, fv = 0.4.
Figure 3 shows the effect of µ on the search efficiency
for an authorized user. As the probability of publishing µ
increases, PANACEA approaches the search efficiency of a
structured system. It is interesting to observe that for only
0.05% of authorized copies of the resource in the system,
setting a small value of µ = 0.6 makes the search efficiency
of PANACEA close to that of structured systems. Hence, we
claim that µ = 0.6 is the appropriate value for this parameter
for the given network and configuration. On the other hand, for
unauthorized users, increasing µ makes the search efficiency of
the proposed system close to that of unstructured P2P systems,
as shown in Figure 4. Therefore, PANACEA design meets its
privacy objectives of Section III. As µ increases, so is the
number of RPP index entries, which reduces the probability
of deducing the existence of the resource as the list of potential
providers grows. In Figures 5 and 6, we highlight the effect of
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m on resource privacy for authorized and unauthorized users
respectively. Clearly, the value of m has no effect on the search
efficiency of authorized users for a given value of µ, as they
discover the resource as long as at least one provider with an
authorized copy of the resource publishes in the DHT (as the
provider is then directly contacted). However, for unauthorized
users, as m increases, their probability to deduce the existence
of the resource decreases due to the increased number of fake
resource keys in the index entry, which is shown in Figure
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6. Thus, with increase in m, PANACEA search efficiency
reaches that of unstructured P2P systems for unauthorized
users. Similar results were obtained for the provider privacy
of authorized and unauthorized users, while varying µ and m.
We omit these results for brevity reasons.
Figure 7 depicts the effect of µ on the search communication
cost for authorized users. As µ increases, the probability to
find a provider where the user is authorized also increases.
Hence, the user finds the resource in the DHT, and thus
need not employ flooding. After µ = 0.6, there is no more
cost improvement. The almost constant difference between
the PANACEA and structured systems costs is due to: i)
the decreasing probability that the resource is not found in
the DHT and then flooding has to be employed, and ii) the
increasing number of providers that have to be contacted as
m grows and more index entries are published in the DHT
(refer to (12)). However, it should be observed from Figure 8
that increase in µ proves to be more costly for unauthorized
users, which is a highly desirable property of PANACEA. The
search cost with respect to n is depicted in Figure 9. As n
increases, the search cost increases as the user has to contact
more number of providers. However, observe that, even for
n = 10, the search cost of PANACEA is several times lower
compared to that of unstructured systems.
Clearly, Figures 3 to 9 prove our initial claims on
PANACEA positioning as related to the structured and un-
structured P2P systems as illustrated in Figure 1. In Figure
10, as the number of providers of the resource Nc increases
in the overlay, we observe a linear increase in the search
cost of PANACEA. However, this cost remains significantly
lower than that of the unstructured P2P systems, and it can
be considered as highly tolerable given the privacy benefits of
PANACEA. If, for certain application, this is undesirable in
terms of scalability, it could be addressed by properly adjusting
values of the parameters µ and n. The search cost can also be
improved having a user contacting the providers listed in an
RPP index sequentially instead of concurrently.
Finally, as explained in Section II-B, probabilistic publish-
ing was introduced to hide the non-existence of resources. As
shown in equations (8) and (14), the PANACEA system meets
its design objectives (Section III) in this case as well, as P− ∼
PU− . Moreover, as shown in equations (15), Cs,− ∼ CUs,−. We
omit the relevant graphs for brevity reasons.
VI. RELATED WORK
There is significant research work in the literature related to
PANACEA, particularly in the areas of access control in P2P
systems, privacy of access-controlled content, and anonymous
P2P systems.
To enable access control in P2P systems, PHera [7] proposes
a fine-grained access control framework based on super-peer-
based P2P overlays where sub-peers specify their access con-
trol policies, which are enforced by the super-peers on behalf
of the former. Super peers index the data of sub-peers and
they could preserve data privacy by not replying to the queries
from unauthorized peers. However, this approach assumes that
all super-peers are unanimously trusted by their sub-peers to
enforce their data privacy and access control policies, which
is difficult in general [8].
Regarding the privacy of access-controlled content, a
privacy-preserving approach for centralized indexing of such
data is proposed in [8]. A group of data providers iteratively
circulate a bloom filter representing the content hosted on
the providers, bits of which are set probabilistically by the
proposed algorithm. At the end of this iterative process,
the index -represented by the bloom filter- emerges, which
preserves data privacy regarding its location (i.e. provider
privacy). However, as opposed to PANACEA, [8] does not
address resource privacy. Furthermore, new resources can
be easily inserted in the index of PANACEA, while index
reconstruction is required in [8].
The OneSwarm system proposed in [9] preserves the pri-
vacy of a peer’s location using cryptographic mechanisms. It
employs an unstructured friend-to-friend overlay for privacy
preserving content sharing. The system allows users to define
permissions for data sharing among trusted friends. Peers
search for data objects using flooding techniques, similar to
access-controlled unstructured systems analyzed in this work.
There exists a large number of works in the area of anony-
mous P2P systems that achieve publisher (source) or reader
(searcher) anonymity or both [1], [10], [6], [11]. Additionally,
the anonymity of a node hosting an index entry (resource) is
also considered [10]. In Freenet system [1], resource identifiers
are generated in several cryptographic ways and are inserted
into the system based on these identifiers. It achieves access
control and resource and provider privacies using crypto-
graphic techniques, which however, involves complicated key
distribution and management overhead. Furthermore, resource
discovery is not guaranteed and involve significant search
communication overhead compared to structured systems. In
addition, the searchers have to be associated with the providers
a priori, in order to be informed about the cryptographic
keys. Instead, in our approach, search efficiency is high and
new searchers can be dynamically authorized by providers to
access the resources. P2P access control system based on such
cryptographic indexing was discussed in [2].
A hybrid P2P system was discussed in [11], which involves
structured and unstructured topologies to achieve sender and
receiver anonymity. By connecting unstructured sub-overlays
via a DHT, sender and receiver identities remain hidden.
Finally, note that searcher anonymity was not among the
design objectives of PANACEA, but it could be easily achieved
in a similar way the anonymous publication was realized in
Section II-B.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed PANACEA, a P2P infras-
tructure to share access-controlled data, which combines high
resource and provider privacies with high search efficiency
for authorized users. We have analytically derived the privacy
and search efficiency properties of the system and numerically
evaluated to show that it meets its design objectives. As a
future work, we intend to study the system behavior in case
of repetitive attacks against system privacy and derive lower
bounds on its effectiveness.
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